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Abstract
This paper presents the rst joint evaluation of the two major labour market
reforms implemented in Spain to foster permanent employment in 1994 and
1997. The 1994 reform restored the principle of causality in the application of
temporary contracts and the 1997 reform introduced a new permanent contract
with lower payroll taxes and dismissal costs than the ordinary one. To evaluate
these non-targeted treatments I present a family of semiparametric estimators
that predict the outcome that would have been observed in the absence of a
treatment by exploiting the time series variation of the outcome in the pre-
treatment period. Alternative counterfactuals are also explored by means of
conventional between-groups estimators. Estimates using the Spanish Labour
Force Survey indicate that employers did not change their contract conversion
practices in response to either the 1994 or the 1997 reform. I also nd that the
1997 reform succeed in increasing unemployment to permanent employment
transition probabilities for most groups of unemployed workers, including the
middle-aged. This result rejects the natural experiment research design in
existing papers analyzing the e¤ects of the 1997 reform.
JEL Classication: J23, J32, J38, J63, J65.
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1 Introduction
Following the notable growth of unemployment rates until mid-1980s, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain increased the exibility of their
labour markets by allowing employers to recruit under non-causal xed-term (also
called temporary) contracts.1 Although regulations vary, a common feature of xed-
term contracts is that severance pay and dismissal protection are lower than those
for indenite or permanent contracts. Since their introduction, xed-term contracts
have accounted for most new hirings in these countries (OECD, 1993).
Spain is a fascinating case to study. Soon after the reform liberalizing xed-term
contracts in 1984 the share of temporary employment was highest within developed
countries. The 1984 reform led to a dual labour market with a third of employees
permanently employed on a temporary basis, receiving lower wages than otherwise
equivalent permanent employees (Bentolila and Dolado, 1994; De la Rica, 2004),
facing a higher work accident risk (Guadalupe, 2003), and also a lower probability
of receiving formal training (Alba-Ramirez, 1994), of marrying and of entering into
parenthood (De la Rica and Iza, 2005).2
The magnitude of the phenomenon placed xed-term contracts and its conse-
quences at the center of the political debate and motivated the application over the
1990s of countervailing reforms aimed at promoting permanent employment.3 The
1994 reform restored the principle of causality in the application of temporary con-
tracts (i.e. there needed to be an objective cause to use them) and o¤ered scal in-
centives for their conversion into permanent ones for certain groups of workers. The
1997 reform further lowered the cost gap between temporary and permanent hiring
1Other six European countries already had no limits on the use of temporary contracts. See
OECD (2004) for an overview of employment protection reforms.
2The literature evaluating the outcome of these reforms at the margin show that they increase
both job creation and job destruction and the variability of employment. However, the overall
impact on equilibrium unemployment is ambiguous. Alonso-Borrego et al. (2005) calibrate a general
equilibrium model with ring costs to Spanish data and nd that xed-term contracts increase
unemployment, reduce output, and raise productivity. Blanchard and Landier (2002) and Zhou
(2006) nd that the introduction of non-causal xed-term contracts in France increased equilibrium
unemployment. Finally, Kahn (2007) evaluates the impact of employment protection reforms in
several European countries and nds no evidence that policies making it easier to create temporary
jobs raise employment.
3In France, the applicability of xed-term contracts was reduced in 1990.
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by introducing a new permanent contract with lower payroll taxes and dismissal costs
than the ordinary one, whose regulation remained unchanged. Any worker except for
the unemployed aged 30 to 45 years old could be hired under the new permanent
contract.
The goal of this paper is to evaluate the success of the 1994 and 1997 reforms in
promoting transitions into permanent employment. By providing an assessment of the
e¤ectiveness of these policies, this paper contributes to the debate on the consequences
of wage and dismissal cost reductions on employershiring and conversion practices.4
While little attention has been paid to the 1994 reform,5 the e¤ect of the 1997
reform on the proportion of temporary workers, transitions into permanent employ-
ment, earnings and workersperception of job insecurity have been analyzed in Dolado
et al. (2002), Kugler et al. (2003), Plá and Ramos (2007) and Trevisan (2007), re-
spectively. By assuming that middle-aged workers were not elegible for the new
permanent contract, they nd that the 1997 reform reduced the incidence of tem-
porary employment in the private sector, improved elegible workerstransitions into
permanent employment and earnings and reduced their perception of job insecurity.
However, the identication strategy in these papers is not correct and, thus, their
conclusions are misleading. Middle-aged unemployed workers could easily recover
eligibility by simple being hired under a temporary contract, since no age eligibility
criteria was stated for temporary workers. That is, the 1997 reform is a non-targeted
reform (i.e. it applies to all employers and workers) and, thus, those papers do not
identify the e¤ect of dismissal cost reductions but the e¤ect of di¤erences in payroll
tax reduction schemes across groups of workers.
Furthermore, the post-reform period in those papers confounds the e¤ect, if any, of
the 1997 reform with that coming from the 1999 National Employment Plan (NEP).
The 1999 NEP, passed on 30th December 1998, announced that payroll tax reductions
would last for one additional year for permanent contracts signed until May 1999 but
4See OECD (1999) and Nickell and Layard (1999) for an overview of this debate.
5Güell and Petrongolo (2007) provide an exception. By estimating duration models for temporary
employment before and after the 1994 reform, they nd that the 1994 reform improved contract
conversions for women, the youth and the less-skilled. However, they do not control for cyclical
e¤ects, which seems relevant given that the 1994 reform coincides with the recovery of the Spanish
economy after a short but severe recession.
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they would be signicantly lower in magnitude and length after that date.
The identication strategy in this paper allows me to identify the e¤ect of non-
targeted treatments like the 1994 and 1997 reforms and the 1999 NEP. I present a
family of semiparametric estimators that predict the outcome that would have been
observed in the absence of a non-targeted treatment by exploiting the time series
variation of the outcome in the pre-treatment period. Alternative counterfactuals are
also explored by means of between-groups estimators. Moreover, I separately identify
the e¤ect of the 1997 reform from that of the 1999 NEP.
Estimates using the Spanish Labour Force Survey (LFS) indicate that employers
did not change their contract conversion practices in response to either the 1994 or
the 1997 reform. The restrictions on the use of one type of temporary contract (the
non-causal one) probably led to a greater use of other types but not to encourage the
use of permanent contracts. Additionally, wage and dismissal cost reductions had no
e¤ect on contract conversions, which primarily respond to employersexibility needs
and union pressures for increased employment stability (Amuedo-Dorantes, 2001).
Regarding unemployed workers, while the 1994 reform had no impact on the hiring
of permanent workers, the 1997 reform increased transition into permanent employ-
ment probabilities for most groups of unemployed workers, including the middle-aged.
This empirical evidence rejects the natural experiment research design in preceding
papers evaluating the 1997 reform.
Finally, estimates attest that employers reacted to the announced reduction in
scal incentives for permanent contracts by increasing permanent hires and contract
conversions in the rst half of 1999. This transitory e¤ect is found for most groups
of workers, including the middle-aged, and is, for unemployed workers, substantially
larger than that coming from the 1997 reform.
To resume, estimates in this paper do not support the hypothesis that wage and,
in particular, dismissal costs are at the center of Spanish employersreliance on tem-
porary employment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the content of
the major labour market reforms implemented in Spain in the last decades. Section
3 presents the identication strategy. Section 4 describes the data used in the esti-
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mation. Section 5 presents and discusses the estimation results and, nally, Section
6 concludes.
2 The Institutional Framework
Until 1984 temporary contracts in Spain were restricted to seasonal, occasional or
temporary jobs and they accounted for less than 10 percent of all existing jobs. The
1984 reform allowed employers to recruit under temporary contracts for all types of
jobs and for a maximum length of three years. After that period the rm had to
convert the temporary worker to a permanent status or to dismiss him.
In the early 1990s the share of temporary employment was a third. The rapid
increase in the number of temporary contracts was the result of the cost gap between
temporary and permanent hiring. Mandatory severance payments for permanent
workers were 20 dayswages per year of tenure (up to one years wages) if the dismissal
was considered fair, and 45 dayswages per year of tenure (up to 42 months of
wages) if the worker disagreed with the dismissal and it was declared unfair in
court.6 In sharp contrast, dismissed temporary workers received an indemnity of 12
dayswages per year worked, which could not be appealed in labour courts. Moreover,
the compensation was zero if the employer waited until the end of the contract, which,
moreover, tends to be very short.7
The rst reform designed to reduce the incidence of temporary employment was
enacted in 1994. The 1994 reform restored the principle of causality in the application
of temporary contracts and introduced scal incentives for their conversion into per-
manent ones for workers aged less than 25 and over 45 years old. Furthermore, in an
attemp to reduce dismissal costs for permanent contracts the procedural requirements
for fairdismissals were relaxed and notice periods were shortened.
Two years after this reform the share of temporary employment remained almost
unchanged. The perceived ine¢ cacy of the 1994 reform along with the fall of the
6Spanish labour courts tend to rule in favor of workers. Over 70 percent of terminations appealed
to courts between 1986 and 2003 were ruled in favor of workers (Galdon-Sanchez and Güell, 2000).
7Own calculations using the Spanish Labour Force Survey indicate that a fourth of temporary
contracts signed between 1987 and 2000 lasted for up to three months. The corresponding percentage
for those lasting up to one year is 70 percent.
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socialist Government in 1996 and its replacement by a conservative Government with
a di¤erent labour policy explain the new attemp to promote permanent employment.
The 1997 reform was the result of several months of tough negotiations between
employersorganizations and the two major unions.8 The reform was enacted in May
1997 and it introduced a new permanent contract with relevant di¤erences with the
existing one, whose regulation remained unchanged. First, mandatory severance pay
for unfairdismissals was 33 dayswages per year of seniority (up to 24 months of
wages) under the new permanent contract. Second, payroll tax reductions ranging
from 40 to 80 percent and lasting for at least two years were introduced for per-
manent hires and contract conversions under the new contract. Third, middle-aged
unemployed workers were not elegible for the new contract. However, this restriction
was not binding in practice since they could easily recover eligibility by simply being
hired under a temporary contract.
Finally, on 30th December 1998 the Spanish government passed the National Em-
ployment Plan (NEP) for 1999. The 1999 NEP announced that payroll tax reductions
would last for one additional year for permanent contracts signed until May 1999 but
they would be signicantly lower in magnitude and length after that date. Table 1
summarizes scal incentives for permanent contracts included in the 1994 and 1997
reforms and the 1999 NEP.
3 The identication strategy
In this section I adapt the estimators commonly used in the treatment e¤ects literature
for the evaluation of targeted treatments (i.e. those applied to certain employers
and/or workers) to the evaluation of non-targeted treatments (i.e. those applied to
all employers and workers). For simplicity, the identication strategy is presented for
unemployed workers and for the case in which there is only one treatment. The same
reasoning works for temporary workers and for the other treatments under evaluation.
Let Y (i; t) be the outcome of interest for individual i at time t. This variable
equals one if individual i moves from unemployment at the beginning of period t to
8The agreement was totally unexpected. Spanish newspapers informed that negotiations were
likely to break down only one month before the agreement was announced (El Pais, March 3, 1997).
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a permanent contract in that period and zero otherwise. Additionally, let X (i; t) be
a vector including information recorded at the beginning of period t relative to indi-
vidual i that is a priori thought to inuence his probability of obtaining a permanent
contract. A non-targeted policy aimed at promoting the hiring of permanent workers
is enacted at the beginning of period t = 1. Variable Di indicates whether individual
i is observed in the pre-treatment period (Di = 0; t < 1) or in the post-treatment
period (Di = 1; t = 1).
Following Rubin (1974) and Heckman (1990) causality is dened in terms of po-
tential outcomes. Variable Y0 (i; t) is the outcome that individual i would attain at
time t if he had not been a¤ected by the treatment. Equivalently, variable Y1 (i; t) is
the outcome that individual i would experience at time t if he had received the treat-
ment. Individual causal e¤ects cannot be computed since just one of these potential
outcomes is observed for a given individual at a given period. Thus, the evaluation
literature analyzes average measures of the e¤ect of the treatment. I focus on the
average gain of receiving treatment for those who e¤ectively receive the treatment.9
This quantity is known as the average treatment e¤ect on the treated (ATET) and is
written as follows:
ATET = E [Y1 (i; t)  Y0 (i; t) jt = 1] = E [Y1 (i; t) jt = 1]  E [Y0 (i; t) jt = 1] (1)
The ATET cannot be identied using observational data since Y0 (i; t) is only observed
for those unemployed in the pre-treatment period. A suitable solution would be to
approximate the proportion of treated unemployed workers that would have obtained
a permanent job in the absence of the treatment by the proportion observed in the last
pre-treatment period. The credibility of this approximation is higher once di¤erences
in the distribution of covariates are controled for. Under this approximation the
ATET is written as follows:10
ATET = E [Y (i; t) jX (i; t) ; t = 1]  E [Y (i; t) jX (i; t) ; t = 0] (2)
This is a before-after-type (BA) estimator and its power to identify the ATET relies
on temporal stability (Holland, 1986). In particular, two conditions must be met: (i)
9The average e¤ect of the treatment for the treated is equivalent to that for an individual ran-
domly drawn from the population in the evaluation of non-targeted treatments.
10Existence of expectations is assumed throughout.
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unobserved individual characteristics and changing aggregate labour market condi-
tions do not a¤ect permanent hires or their overall average impact remains constant
over time; (ii) the e¤ect of events other than the treatment that happen between these
two periods do not contaminate the causal analysis. The assumption underlying this
estimator is formally written as follows:
ASSUMPTION 3.1: E [Y0 (i; t) jX (i; t) ; t = 1] = E [Y0 (i; t) jX (i; t) ; t = 0]
Following Meyer (1995), Assumption 3.1 is examined by sequentially estimating equa-
tion (2) in the pre-treatment period.11 Under Assumption 3.1 the vector of pre-
treatment estimates is not signicantly di¤erent from zero and, thus, conditioning on
observables su¢ ces to identify the ATET.12 If Assumption 3.1 is rejected, the BA es-
timator does not provide information on the outcome that would have been observed
in the post-treatment period in the absence of the treatment and, thus, it does not
identify the ATET. In that case I consider an alternative estimator and examine its
identication assumption in the pre-treatment period.
The next estimator that I consider is a di¤erence-in-di¤erences-type (DD) esti-
mator assuming that the average conditional (on X) outcome experiences a constant
increment over time in the absence of the treatment. Equivalently, in the evaluation
of targeted treatments the DD estimator identies the ATET under the assumption
that the average conditional outcome experiences the same increment over time for
the treated and control groups in the absence of the treatment.13 The identication
assumption underlying the DD estimator is the following:14
ASSUMPTION 3.2: E [Y0jX; t = 1] E [Y0jX; t = 0] = E [Y0jX; t = 0] E [Y0jX; t =  1]
11Meyer (1995) stated that an underemphasized advantadge of a long time-series for outcome
measures is that they may allow the researcher to examine the hypothesis underlying the imple-
mented estimator.
12This approach is named selection on observables (Barnow, Cain, and Goldberger (1981)), ignor-
able treatment assignment (Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)) or conditional independence assumption
(Lechner (1999)).
13See Angrist and Krueger (1999) for an overview of the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator in the
evaluation of targeted treatments.
14Hereinafter the individual and time arguments i and t will dropped out to simplify the notation.
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Under Assumption 3.2 the ATET can be expressed as follows:
ATET = fE [Y jX; t = 1]  E [Y jX; t = 0] g
 fE [Y jX; t = 0]  E [Y jX; t =  1]g . (3)
As before, Assumption 3.2 is tested by sequentially estimating equation (3) in the pre-
treatment period. If the vector of pre-treatment DD estimates is signicantly di¤erent
from zero I move to an estimator identifying the ATET under the assumption that
the average conditional outcome increases at a constant rate in the absence of the
treatment. This assumption is formally written as follows:
ASSUMPTION 3.3: Let 0 denote the increment in the average conditional outcome
that would have been observed in the absence of the treatment between periods t =  1
and t =  , that is, 0 = E [Y0jX; t =  ]  E [Y0jX; t =    1], then
01  00 = 00  0 1
To compactly write the estimator that identies the ATET under Assumption 3.3,
let  represent the increment in the average conditional outcome between periods
t =    1 and t =  , that is,  = E [Y jX; t =  ]  E [Y jX; t =    1], then
ATET = f1  0g   f0   1g (4)
This estimator is a di¤erence-in-di¤erence-in-di¤erences-type (DDD) estimator.15 The
DD and BA estimators are particular cases of the DDD estimator. If the average
conditional outcome follows a linear time trend or remains constant in the absence
of the treatment Assumption 3.3 simplies to Assumption 3.2 or Assumption 3.1,
respectively. More sophisticated estimators could be dened for the case in which
Assumption 3.3 is rejected. However, the discussion is limited to those implemented
in the analysis.
Abadie (2005) develops a simple two-step method to estimate the e¤ect of a tar-
geted treatment on the treated using the DD estimator. That procedure is now
adapted to the case in which the DDD estimator is used to identify the e¤ect of
a non-targeted treatment. Assumption 3.4 is necessary for the evaluation problem
15See Meyer (1995) for an overview of the DDD estimator in the evaluation of targeted treatments.
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to be well dened. Since identication is attained after conditioning on covariates,
it is required that for a given value of the covariates there is some fraction of the
population in the pre-treatment period to be used as controls.
ASSUMPTION 3.4: P (D = 1) > 0 and with probability one P (D = 1jX) < 1.
Some additional notation is needed at this point. Let D 2 f0; 1g indicate whether
the unemployed worker is observed at period t =  (D = 1) and let  be:
 =
D
P (t =  jX)  
D 1
P (t =    1jX)
LEMMA 3.1. If Assumption 3.3 holds, and for values of X such that 0 < P (t = 1jX) <
1, we have E [Y1 (1)  Y0 (1) jX; t = 1] = E [Y jX], where
 = (1  0)  (0   1)
A formal proof of Lemma 3.1 can be easily derived from Abadie (2005). The ex-
pression for  is obtained by replacing conditional expectations at t =  by terms
like (D=P (t =  jX)) in equation (4). Under Assumptions 3.3 and 3.4 the ATET is
identied by:
E [Y1 (1)  Y0 (1) jt = 1] =
Z
E [Y1 (1)  Y0 (1) jX; t = 1] dP (Xjt = 1)
=
Z
E [Y jX] dP (Xjt = 1)
= E

Y
P (t = 1jX)
P (t = 1)

= E
24 Y
P (t = 1)
P (t = 1jX) | {z }
!
35 (5)
where ! can be written after some algebra as:
! = D1   3D0P (t = 1jX)
P (t = 0jX) + 3D 1
P (t = 1jX)
P (t =  1jX)  D 2
P (t = 1jX)
P (t =  2jX)
Equation (5) suggests a simple two-step method to estimate the ATET under As-
sumptions 3.3 and 3.4. First, conditional probabilites are estimated by means of a
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multinomial logit model and tted values of P (t = 1jX) and P (t = kjX) are com-
puted for the unemployed at pre-treatment period t = k, for k = f0;  1;  2g.16
Second, tted values are plugged into the sample analog of equation (5).17 Under As-
sumptions 3.3 and 3.4 a simple weighted average of the outcome variable recovers the
ATET. The weighting function ! imposes the distribution of covariates for treated
unemployed workers at any pre-treatment period.18
The expressions for  and ! in a general T -period estimator are the following:
 =
T 1X
j=0
"
Dj (T 2) ( 1)j+T+1
 
T 1
j

P (t = j   (T   2) jX)
#
! =
T 1X
j=0
"
Dj (T 2) ( 1)j+T+1
 
T 1
j

P (t = 1jX)
P (t = j   (T   2) jX)
#
The expressions for the DDD, DD and BA estimators are those for T = 4, T = 3 and
T = 2, respectively. The asymptotic properties of the general T -period estimator are
presented in the Appendix.
Finally, the discrete nature of the dependent variable may imply that the as-
sumptions underlying the estimators do not hold for the expectations but for some
transformation thereof. Following Blundell et al. (2001), I assume that the assump-
tions hold, if anything, for the inverse of the probability function, which I assume to
be the inverse logistic.
4 The Data
The data is drawn from the rotating panel version of the Spanish Labour Force Survey
(LFS). This nationally representative survey is carried out on a quarterly basis on
a sample of approximately 64,000 households. Each household is interviewed for a
maximum of six consecutive quarters and every quarter one sixth of the sample is
renewed. The avaliable sample period ranges from the second quarter of 1987 to
the fourth quarter of year 2000. That is, it starts soon after the liberalization of
16The conditional probability of receiving treatment given individual characteristics (P (t = 1=X))
is known as the propensity score.
17Following Abadie (2005), I assume that  =  1 if P (t = 1jX) = 0. That choice is inconsequential
since the objects of interest will be integrals over the distribution of the X conditional on t = 1.
18See Abadie (2005) for a detailed description of the weighting scheme.
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temporary contracts and it covers the 1994 and 1997 counter-reforms and the 1999
NEP.
Employers, self-employed, agricultural and family workers, coop members and
those aged 65 and over are dropped from each quarter total sample. Sociodemographic
information such as gender, age, level of education, region of residence, marital status,
whether the individual is the head of his household or not and the number of employed
household members but him is included in the analysis. Equivalently, individual
employment records such as tenure at current job and sector of activity are also
included. The same information is considered for unemployed workers referred to their
last job, if any. Similarly, I also control for the length of their current unemployment
spell, whether they receive unemployment benets or not and whether they have
previous work experience or not.
Information on tenure at current and previous job is based on self-reported elapsed
duration. The LFS records the answers in months whenever elapsed duration is lower
than one year and in years otherwise. Following Güell and Petrongolo (2007), I
randomly replace each rounded elapsed duration by one of the quarterly durations
implied.
Tables 2A and 2B describe the data at hand for temporary and unemployed work-
ers, respectively. Transition probabilities are computed as the proportion of tem-
porary and unemployed workers at a given quarter that hold a permanent contract
in the following quarter. Transition into permanent employment probabilities are
much lower after the 1994 reform than before. Regarding the 1997 reform, contract
conversions decrease but transitions into permanent employment for younger and
middle-aged unemployed workers increase once the 1997 reform is enacted.
A more detailed description of the data is provided in Figures 1 to 4. Figures
1 and 2 (Figures 3 and 4) plot transition into permanent employment probabilities
for male and female temporary (unemployed) workers, respectively. The information
in these gures can be summarized in four points. First, transition probabilities
follow a loosely monotonically decreasing time trend over the sample period. Second,
transition probabilities become stable by approximately 1994, that is, coinciding with
the introduction of the 1994 reform and the recovery of the Spanish economy. Third,
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no signicant change in transition probabilities is observed once the 1997 reform is
enacted. Finally, permanent hires and contract conversions increase in the rst half
of 1999, that is, before the reduction in scal incentives for permanent contracts
announced in the 1999 NEP.
Obviously, no causal conclusion regarding the e¢ cacy of these policies can be
reached at this point. Di¤erences in the distribution of covariates among employees at
di¤erent periods and/or changes in business cycle conditions might totally or partially
explain the observed pattern of transitions into permanent employment. In the next
section I implement the identication strategy outlined in the preceding section to
properly isolate the e¤ects of interest.
5 Empirical results
In the empirical analysis period t = 1 collects ows into permanent employment
between quarters  and  +1, for  = f1997:3; 1997:4; 1998:1g and, thus, it captures
the e¤ect, if any, of the 1997 reform. Equivalently, period t = 2 is a three-quarter
period ranging from 1998:3 to 1999:1 that includes the period of higher scal incentives
for permanent contracts dened in the 1999 NEP. Remaining periods are dened to
include the same distribution of quarters than these two periods. I control for seasonal
e¤ects by including the quarter at which the worker is observed in X. Estimation
results are separately discussed for temporary and unemployed workers.
5.1 Temporary workers
Table 3 presents BA estimates for younger, middle-aged and older male and female
temporary workers. Under Assumption 3.1, the estimates obtained when comparing
periods t and t + 1, for t =  3, t = 0 and t = 1, identify the e¤ect on temporary to
permanent transition probabilities of the 1994 and 1997 reforms and the 1999 NEP,
respectively.
Estimates indicate that Assumption 3.1 holds for older female temporary workers
and that none of the policies under evaluation succeed in increasing their probability
of working under a permanent contract. The same holds for older men regarding
the 1997 reform and the 1999 NEP, since Assumption 3.1 is not rejected from 1993
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onwards and, thus, BA estimates provide information on the e¤ect of these two poli-
cies. This is an interesting result since, as shown in Table 1, scal incentives for the
conversion of temporary contracts into permanent ones were highest in the 1994 and
1997 reforms for workers aged over 45 years. The signicant estimates obtained in
the pre-reform period indicate that the e¤ect of the 1994 reform for older men cannot
be analyzed using the BA estimator.
Regarding middle-aged workers, their probability of obtaining a permanent posi-
tion decreases until 1994, particularly so for men. Then, coinciding with the recovery
of the Spanish economy and the introduction of the 1994 reform there starts a period
of stability that is replaced in 1996 by a new decreasing trend that continues once the
1997 reform is enacted. Finally, estimates indicate that transitions from temporary
to permanent employment were signicantly higher than expected in period t = 2.
The picture for younger workers is the same as for the middle-aged but in the
period following the introduction of the 1997 reform. In period t = 1 contract conver-
sions decrease for the middle-aged while they remain unchanged for younger workers.
For women, the di¤erential in the stability of temporary to permanent transition
probabilities between younger and middle-aged workers is observed from 1994.
These estimates are not informative about the e¤ect of the 1994 and 1997 reforms
for younger and middle-aged workers. First, the stability of contract conversions
from 1994 onwards could totally or partially be due to the recovery of the Spanish
economy after a short but severe recession in which more than 800,000 employees were
dismissed between 1991 and 1993.19 Second, Assumption 3.1 is rejected for younger
men and middle-aged workers in some estimates between the 1994 and 1997 reforms
and, thus, the BA estimator does not approximate the outcome that would have been
observed for these workers in period t = 1 in the absence of the 1997 reform. This
assumption only holds from 1994 onwards for younger women and estimates show that
their probability of working under a permanent contract did not increase in response
to the 1997 reform.
19Amuedo-Dorantes and Malo (2005) nd, using data on Spanish establishments, that net employ-
ment growth expectations for the short-run are met with increases in net permanent job creation
and hiring rates, where net employment growth expectations are proxies of expected booms and
crises.
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Conversely, estimates attest that employers reacted to the reduction in scal in-
centives for permanent contracts announced in the 1999 NEP by increasing transitions
from temporary to permanent employment for younger and middle-aged workers in
the rst half of 1999. The implementation of the BA estimator over the sample
period allows me to examine if movements of a given magnitude are more or less
common than standard errors suggest (Meyer, 1995).20 The only positive and signi-
cant estimate in Table 3 is that for period t = 2. Furthermore, estimates of a similar
magnitude (in absolute value) to that for period t = 2 are only found in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, that is, ve or six years before the 1999 NEP.
This result conrms that middle-aged temporary workers were not excluded by
1997 reformers and, thus, it rejects the natural experiment research design in pre-
ceding papers evaluating the 1997 reform. The estimated e¤ect for younger women
amounts to an improvement of 32.7 percent in their probability of working under a
permanent contract in period t = 1. The magnitude of the e¤ect for the other groups
of temporary workers is derived from the estimator whose identication assumption
holds in the pre-treatment period.
In Table 4 I analyze if the DD estimator identies the e¤ects of interest for younger
and middle-aged workers and older men. Assumption 3.2 is not rejected for middle-
aged workers and estimates indicate that the 1994 and 1997 reforms failed at improv-
ing their temporary to permanent transition probabilities. Additionally, estimates
conrm that their probability of working under a permanent contract was signicantly
higher than expected in period t = 2. Middle-aged males(females) probability of
obtaining a permanent contract improved by 43.2 (71.0) percent following the intro-
duction of the 1999 NEP. The negative and signicant estimate obtained in period
t = 3 amounts to an equivalent reduction in their temporary to permanent transition
probabilities and, thus, it conrms the transitory nature of the latter improvement.
Regarding younger men, Assumption 3.2 cannot be rejected from t =  2 onwards
and, thus, these estimates provide information on the e¤ect of the 1997 reform and
the 1999 NEP for these workers. Estimates indicate that the 1997 reform had no
20Blundell et al. (2001) proceed in a similar way when estimating the impact of a mandatory job
search assistance program. They implement the estimator in the pre-treatment period to analyze
whether the estimated e¤ect of the programme lies whithin typical values of the historical estimates.
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impact on their contract conversion prospects and that their probability of obtaining
a permanent contract improved by 37.4 percent in the period including the rst half
of 1999. Assumption 3.2 also holds in the pre-1994 reform period for older men.
Estimates show that this reform had no e¤ect on their temp-to-perm transition
probabilities. Conversely, this Assumption is rejected for younger women in the pre-
1994 reform period.
Next, I examine whether the DDD estimator identies the e¤ect of the 1994 re-
form for younger workers. Estimates in Table 5 show that this estimator properly
captures the decreasing trend that dominates younger workerstemporary to perma-
nent transition probabilities in the pre-reform period and that the 1994 reform had
no impact on that probability.
To resume, estimates indicate that the 1994 and 1997 reforms did not improve
contract conversions for any group of temporary workers. This result suggests that
temporary hiring was a deep-rooted practice among Spanish employers at the time
of the 1994 reform and, thus, the restrictions to the use of one type of temporary
contract (the non-causal one) probably led to a greater use of other types but not
to encourage the use of permanent contracts. Regarding the 1997 reform, estimates
suggest that employers might be unwilling to forgo employment exibility through
contract conversion regardless of the employment cost.
Within-group estimators in the preceding tables indicate that a treatment is e¤ec-
tive if the value of the outcome in the post-treatment period exceeds that expected
given the time trend it follows in the pre-treatment period. However, it might be
the case that an e¤ective treatment provokes no signicant di¤erence between the
observed and the expected values of the outcome in the post-treatment period. For
example, it might be argued that younger and older workersprobability of obtaining
a permanent position would have decreased in period t = 1 in the absence of the 1997
reform, as it did for middle-aged workers.
To account for this alternative I implement a between-groups analysis where I com-
pare, for each period t, temporary to permanent transition probabilities for younger
(older) and middle-aged workers once di¤erences in the distribution of covariates are
controlled for. By implementing this estimator in the pre-treatment period I exam-
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ine an alternative counterfactual assuming that the average conditional outcome that
would have been observed for younger and older workers in the absence of a treatment
is that for the middle-aged.
Estimates in Table 6 show that younger malestemporary to permanent transition
probability is not signicantly di¤erent from that for middle-aged men until 1996.21
Then, middle-aged males probability of obtaining a permanent contract becomes
signicantly lower than that for younger men and it remains at lower values once
the 1997 reform is enacted. That is, middle-aged men are not a valid control group
for analyzing the e¤ect of the 1997 reform for younger men using this estimator.
Between-groups DD estimates, not shown to save space, capture the di¤erence in the
outcome variable that emerges between these two groups prior to the 1997 reform
and show no signicant di¤erence following the introduction of the reform.22
Additionally, estimates show a signicant increase in the transition from tem-
porary to permanent employment for older relative to middle-aged men following
the introduction of the 1999 NEP. No signicant di¤erent is found in the preceding
periods.
Regarding women, I nd that the probability of obtaining a permanent contract
cannot be rejected to be the same for younger and middle-aged workers except for
the period following the introduction of the 1997 reform, when that probability was
higher for younger women. This result suggests that younger femalesprobability
of working under a permanent contract would have decreased in the absence of the
1997 reform, as it did for middle-aged women. However, between-groups estimates for
unemployed workers in the following subsection suggest an alternative interpretation
to this result.
Estimates in Table 6 indicate that the 1994 reform and the 1999 NEP had no
e¤ect on younger and older workerstemporary to permanent transition probabilities.
However, nding that a non-targeted treatment is not e¤ective using a between-groups
estimator has two alternative and untestable implications. On the one hand, it might
21Güell and Petrongolo (2007) also nd, using the Spanish LFS, that the age of a temporary
worker has a limited e¤ect on his probability of obtaining a permanent contract. In particular, they
nd that this probability increases from the category 16 to 24 years old to the category 24-34 years
old and stays constant afterwards.
22These estimates are available upon request to the author.
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be that the treatment has no e¤ect for any of the two groups and, on the other
hand, it might be that it has similar e¤ects on both groups. Within-group estimates
clarify the interpretation of non-signicant estimates in Table 6 by showing that the
1994 reform failed at improving contract conversions and that the reduction in scal
incentives for permanent contracts announced in the 1999 NEP provoked a transitory
and sizeable increase in transitions from temporary to permanent employment in the
rst half of 1999.
Finally, Kugler et al. (2003) nd that the 1997 reform increased transitions from
temporary to permanent employment for younger relative to middle-aged workers
during the reform years. An equivalent result emerges from estimates in Table 6
if the post-reform period includes periods t = f1; 2; 3g, as in Kugler et al. (2003).
Furthermore, they nd a negative e¤ect for older relative to middle-aged men, as I
do in period t = 2. That is, Kugler et al. (2003) only identify the e¤ect of di¤erences
in payroll tax reduction schemes across groups of workers.
5.2 Unemployed workers
As shown in Table 7, permanent hires decrease from the beginning of the sample
period until mid 1990s and then become stable. That is, Assumption 3.1 cannot
be rejected from 1994 onwards and, thus, BA estimates provide information on the
e¤ect of the 1997 reform and the 1999 NEP. According to these estimates, younger
workersunemployment to permanent employment transition probability improved
as a result of these two policies, with the e¤ect of the 1999 NEP being substantially
larger than that of the 1997 reform. In particular, younger males(females) proba-
bility of working under a permanent contract increased by 22.9 (26.2) and 42.5 (62.0)
percent following the introduction of the 1997 reform and the 1999 NEP, respectively.
Equivalently, the estimated e¤ect of the 1997 reform for older men amounts to an
improvement of 59.3 percent in their probability of moving from unemployment to a
permanent contract.
Interestingly, I nd that middle-aged unemployed workers also beneted from
these two policies. This result further rejects the identication strategy in preceding
papers analyzing the e¤ects of the 1997 reform. Middle-aged femalesprobability of
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obtaining a permanent contract increased by 61.1 and 35.7 percent following the intro-
duction of the 1997 reform and the 1999 NEP, respectively. Conversely, middle-aged
men only beneted from the 1999 NEP. Their probability of obtaining a permanent
contract increased by 35.7 percent in period t = 2.
Moving to the analysis of the 1994 reform, Assumption 3.1 is not rejected for older
women and for middle-aged unemployed workers in the pre-reform period. Estimates
for these groups show no signicant e¤ect coming from the 1994 reform. Estimates in
Table 8 conrm that Assumption 3.2 holds in the pre-reform period for the remaining
groups of unemployed workers and they allow me to conclude that the 1994 reform
failed at promoting permanent hires for any group of unemployed workers.
As for temporary workers, I explore alternative counterfactuals with between-
groups estimates in Table 9. I nd that unemployment to permanent employment
transition probabilities cannot be rejected to be the same for younger and middle-
aged women but in the period following the introduction of the 1997 reform, when
that probability was higher for middle-aged women.
Between-group estimates for temporary workers suggested that younger women
beneted from the 1997 reform since their probability of obtaining a permanent con-
tract did not decrease once the reform was enacted, as it did for middle-aged women.
An alternative interpretation to this result emerges if between-group estimates for
temporary and unemployed workers are jointly considered. This interpretation states
that the 1997 reform had no impact on contract conversions but improved perma-
nent hires for some groups of unemployed workers, including middle-aged women.
To be elegible for the new permanent contract middle-aged women were hired under
a temporary contract. These temporary jobs were rapidly turned into permanent
ones, explaining the negative (positive) between-group estimate obtained in the pe-
riod following the introduction of the 1997 reform for middle-aged female temporary
(unemployed) workers.
Evidence in Amuedo-Dorantes (2001) supports this interpretation. She exam-
ines the determinants of Spanish employersreliance on temporary workers and nds
that wage and dismissal cost reductions for permanent contracts promote the hir-
ing of permanent workers but have almost no impact on contract conversions, which
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primarily respond to employersexibility needs and unionspressures for increased
employment stability.
Finally, if the post-1997 reform period includes periods t = f1; 2; 3g, estimates in
Table 9 suggest that the 1997 reform increased unemployment to permanent employ-
ment transition probabilities for younger relative to middle-aged men, as in Kugler et
al. (2003). This result only captures the di¤erential e¤ect across groups of workers
of the reduction in scal incentives for permanent contracts announced in the 1999
NEP. That is, estimates in Kugler et al. (2003) provide no information on the e¤ect
of dismissal cost reductions on transitions into permanent employment.
6 Conclusions
This paper presents the rst joint evaluation of the two major labour market reforms
implemented in Spain to promote permanent employment in 1994 and 1997. The 1994
reform restored the principle of causality in the application of temporary contracts
and o¤ered scal incentives for their conversion into permanent ones for certain groups
of workers. The 1997 reform further lowered the cost gap between temporary and
permanent hiring by introducing a new permanent contract with lower payroll taxes
and dismissal costs than the ordinary one, whose regulation remained unchanged.
Any worker except for the unemployed aged 30 to 45 years old could be hired under
the new permanent contract.
This is not the rst paper that evaluates the 1997 reform. Its e¤ect on the pro-
portion of temporary workers, net ows into permanent employment, earnings and
workersperception of job insecurity have been analyzed in Dolado et al. (2002),
Kugler et al. (2003), Plá and Ramos (2007) and Trevisan (2007), respectively. I
argue that estimation results in these papers are misleading since their identication
strategy is not correct. They implement a natural experiment research design by as-
suming that middle-aged workers were not elegible for the new permament contract.
However, middle-aged unemployed workers could easily recover eligibility by simple
being hired under a temporary contract, since no age eligibility criteria was stated
for temporary workers. That is, the 1997 reform is a non-targeted treatment and,
thus, preceding papers only identify the e¤ect of di¤erences in payroll tax reductions
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schemes across groups of workers.
Furthermore, the post-reform period in those papers confounds the e¤ect, if any,
of the 1997 reform with that of the 1999 National Employment Plan (NEP). The
1999 NEP, passed on 30th December 1998, announced that scal incentives would
last for one additional year for permanent contracts signed until May 1999 but would
be signicantly lower in magnitude and length after that date.
The identication strategy in this paper allows me to identify the e¤ect of non-
targeted treatments like the 1994 and 1997 reforms and the 1999 NEP. I present a
family of semiparametric estimators that predict the outcome that would have been
observed in the absence of a non-targeted treatment by exploiting the time series
variation of the outcome in the pre-treatment period. Alternative counterfactuals are
also explored by means of between-groups estimators.
Estimates using the Spanish Labour Force Survey (LFS) do not support the hy-
pothesis that wage and, in particular, dismissal costs are at the center of Spanish
employersreliance on temporary employment. Employers did not change their con-
tract conversion practices in response to either the 1994 or the 1997 reform. The
restrictions on the use of one type of temporary contract (the non-causal one) proba-
bly led to a greater use of other types rather than encouraging the use of permanent
contracts. Additionally, wage and dismissal cost reductions had no e¤ect on contract
conversions, which primarily respond to employersexibility needs and union pres-
sures for increased employment stability (Amuedo-Dorantes, 2001). Employers might
be unwilling to forgo employment exibility through contract conversion regardless
of the employment cost.
Regarding unemployed workers, while the 1994 reform had no impact on perma-
nent hires, the 1997 reform succeeded in increasing permanent hires for most groups
of unemployed workers, including the middle-aged. This empirical evidence rejects
the natural experiment research design in existing papers evaluating the 1997 reform.
Finally, estimates attest that employers reacted to the announced reduction in
scal incentives for permanent contracts by increasing permanent hires and contract
conversions in the rst half of 1999. This transitory e¤ect is found for most groups
of workers, including the middle-aged, and is, for unemployed workers, substantially
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larger than that coming from the 1997 reform.
The 1997 reform failed at reducing the proportion of temporary workers because
it had no e¤ect on contract conversions, which account for 85 percent of permanent
contracts signed in Spain. Cebrian et al. (2005) indicate another reason why this
proportion has resisted to decrease since the introduction of the 1997 reform. They
analyze administrative records on permanent contracts in Spain and nd that per-
manent hires under the new contract increase the hazard rate of ending the contract
by 15-30 percent relative to that of ordinary permanent contracts. They conclude
that Spanish employers took advantadge of wage and dismissal cost reductions to
substitute permanent contracts for otherwise temporary ones.
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7 Appendix. Estimation and asymptotic variance
The two-step method developed in Abadie (2005) to estimate the the e¤ect of a
targeted treatment on the treated using the DD estimator is now adapted to the
evaluation of non-targeted treatments using the general T -period estimator. Consider
the following estimator of the ATET:
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,
and k (X) = P (t = k=X), for k = f1; 0; 1; 2; :::g. Let n be the total number of
observations involved in the estimation of 0 and nk the number of observations at
period t = k. Let me consider the following estimator of 0:
^
 =

1
n
nP
i=1
^
1 (Xi)
 1
1
n
nP
i=1
^
1 (Xi)
^
iYi,
where
^
i =
T 1X
j=0
"
D(j (T 2))i ( 1)j+T+1
 
T 1
j

^
j (T 2) (Xi)
#
,
and
^
k (Xi) is an estimator of k (Xi), for k = f1; 0; 1; 2; :::g. Under the conditions
stated in the following theorem
^
 is well-dened with probability approaching one.
ASSUMPTION A1: (i) 0 is an interior point of a compact set    Rk, where k =
r (T   1) and r is the dimension ofX; (ii) the support ofX is a subset of a compact set
S, E [XX 0] is nonsingular; (iii) for k = f1; 0; 1; 2; :::g there is a (known) function
k : R ! [0; 1] such that k (X) = k (X 00); (iv) let  = fx0 : x 2 S;  2  g; for
v 2  and for k = f1; 0; 1; 2; :::g, k (v) is bounded away from zero and one,
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strictly increasing and continuously di¤erentiable with derivative bounded away from
zero and one; (v) 0 is an interior point of a compact set   R; (vi) EY 2 <1.
Under Assumption A1, 0 can be estimated by Maximum Likelihood:
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, for k = f1; 0; 1; 2; :::g. Assumption A1 allows us to
estimate previous discrete choice model by multinomial logit or probit models. Let
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THEOREM A1: If nk ! 1 for each k, and assumptions 3.4 and A1 hold, thenp
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(Zi). A formal proof of Theorem A1 can be
easily derived from the proof of Theorem 4.3 in Abadie (2005) by properly replacing
 and the rst step likelihood function by its particular expressions for the T -period
estimator. Similarly, it can be easily shown that under the assumptions of Theorem
A1 and assuming that k (v) is twice di¤erentiable with bounded second derivative
in ,
^
V
p! V (see Theorem4.4 in Abadie (2005)).
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Table 1. Summary of payroll tax reductions for permanent contracts in Spain
Age group May 1994 May 1997 January 1999 May 1999
Unemployed workers
16-29 - 40%, 24 months 25% additional year 35% rst year
25% second year
> 45 - 60%, 24 months Not modied 45% rst year
50% thereafter 40% thereafter
Temporary workers
16-45 2.400 euros 50%, 24 months 25% additional year 25%, 24 months
20% third year
> 45 50% contract life 60%, 24 months Not modied 25% contract life
and 3.000 euros 50% thereafter
Note:  For workers aged less than 25 years old.
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Table 2A. Descriptive statistics by sex and age group before and after the 1994 and
1997 reforms. Temporary workers
Pre-1994 reform Between-reforms Post-1997 reform
< 30 30 to 45 > 45 < 30 30 to 45 > 45 < 30 30 to 45 > 45
MEN
Age 20.9 33.9 49.8 21.5 33.9 49.5 21.4 34.0 49.5
(3.3) (4.0) (4.7) (3.2) (4.0) (4.7) (3.2) (4.0) (4.6)
Tenure (in months) 29.1 34.6 33.7 17.1 22.7 23.2 26.9 39.4 38.1
(36.5) (44.4) (44.4) (26.8) (37.5) (35.9) (38.5) (47.4) (53.2)
Private sector 91.4 89.3 87.8 92.4 90.0 89.3 92.7 89.4 88.4
Head of Household 11.9 72.9 92.2 11.6 70.8 91.9 8.6 65.4 89.1
Married 15.2 78.1 91.6 13.5 75.7 91.5 9.1 70.1 89.2
No education 1.6 10.2 32.8 0.9 5.2 23.7 0.7 3.3 16.6
Primary education 21.8 53.3 58.4 14.7 38.2 59.5 12.2 31.0 60.4
Secondary education 53.5 23.6 5.4 54.8 38.4 11.5 57.1 45.5 16.4
Technical education 17.5 6.3 1.6 22.0 9.9 2.7 16.7 9.0 2.8
University education 5.6 6.7 1.9 7.6 8.3 2.6 13.2 11.1 3.8
Permanent contract
probability 8.55 11.01 9.72 4.21 5.61 4.70 4.62 4.69 3.68
N 75207 32787 14565 37356 21974 9210 49695 29304 12351
WOMEN
Age 20.6 34.0 49.3 21.4 34.0 48.6 21.6 34.0 48.7
(3.3) (4.0) (4.8) (3.2) (4.0) (4.5) (3.1) (4.0) (4.4)
Tenure (in months) 30.5 38.1 50.4 17.9 28.4 31.7 25.1 42.9 48.6
(37.9) (51.5) (66.1) (31.5) (51.2) (57.9) (38.0) (68.0) (74.4)
Private sector 84.3 75.9 85.5 87.7 74.8 83.2 87.5 70.1 80.4
Head of Household 1.8 11.2 22.4 2.9 12.6 21.4 3.5 14.9 25.5
Married 14.4 69.5 72.3 14.8 68.0 75.4 12.1 64.8 71.8
No education 1.1 9.4 35.0 0.6 4.2 23.4 0.3 2.0 13.4
Primary education 12.8 43.0 52.7 8.0 29.5 53.7 5.9 20.0 53.0
Secondary education 52.8 26.7 7.9 49.4 36.2 15.1 47.3 41.9 23.4
Technical education 19.4 6.3 1.5 24.3 12.4 3.7 18.2 11.2 4.2
University education 14.0 14.7 2.9 17.7 17.8 4.1 28.4 24.8 6.1
Permanent contract
probability 8.10 8.30 8.32 4.36 4.78 4.91 4.30 3.37 3.03
N 50103 17305 6561 25188 13425 4420 35258 19826 5806
Note: The table reports means and percentages for continuous and discrete variables, respectively.
Standard deviations are in parenthesis for continuous variables.
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Table 2B. Descriptive statistics by sex and age group before and after the 1994 and
1997 reforms. Unemployed workers
Pre-1994 reform Between-reforms Post-1997 reform
< 30 30 to 45 > 45 < 30 30 to 45 > 45 < 30 30 to 45 > 45
MEN
Age 20.5 33.9 51.0 21.0 33.9 50.3 21.0 34.0 50.5
(3.3) (4.0) (5.0) (3.3) (4.0) (4.9) (3.4) (4.0) (4.8)
Worked before 58.7 96.8 99.9 64.7 96.4 99.9 59.8 95.0 99.7
Head of Household 6.6 62.2 89.8 5.8 53.8 88.2 4.4 50.6 83.5
Married 9.1 65.9 86.7 7.6 58.2 84.8 5.0 50.8 79.9
No education 2.5 12.4 38.4 1.8 7.3 28.5 1.1 4.1 19.3
Primary education 23.4 51.6 51.1 17.0 37.4 54.5 13.2 31.8 53.8
Secondary education 51.6 23.7 6.7 53.1 38.6 11.3 53.8 43.1 19.0
Technical education 15.0 5.6 1.6 18.7 9.4 3.2 15.3 8.8 3.2
University education 7.4 6.7 2.3 9.4 7.3 2.5 16.6 12.2 4.7
Permanent contract
probability 2.26 2.86 2.11 0.91 1.27 1.05 1.47 1.64 1.65
N 56850 19170 11560 31819 15555 8785 26551 13393 7639
WOMEN
Age 20.5 33.6 48.9 21.1 33.7 48.8 21.3 33.8 48.8
(3.3) (4.0) (4.5) (3.3) (3.9) (4.4) (3.2) (3.9) (4.5)
Worked before 45.4 71.9 73.2 54.8 83.5 83.1 52.6 83.6 85.2
Head of Household 1.0 8.8 20.2 1.6 90.1 22.0 2.2 11.9 21.6
Married 16.7 71.2 73.9 17.0 69.6 74.3 13.9 69.1 75.1
No education 1.3 6.7 27.3 1.0 4.1 21.9 0.6 2.8 14.1
Primary education 13.6 39.8 56.0 9.9 26.7 52.4 7.4 20.6 50.6
Secondary education 53.0 32.6 12.0 48.7 40.4 18.5 48.0 44.7 25.3
Technical education 18.1 7.7 1.8 22.6 14.7 4.0 18.8 13.5 4.9
University education 14.1 13.3 2.8 17.7 14.2 3.2 25.2 18.5 5.2
Permanent contract
probability 1.43 1.04 1.15 0.59 0.53 0.78 1.14 0.93 0.67
N 68950 18727 5131 38057 18160 5396 37619 20967 6555
Note: The table reports means and percentages for continuous and discrete variables, respectively.
Standard deviations are in parenthesis for continuous variables.
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Table 3. Before-After estimates. Temporary workers
Men Women
Period Quarters 16 to 29 30 to 45 46 to 64 16 to 29 30 to 45 46 to 64
t =  9 1987:3-1988:1 -0.0317 -0.0078 0.0015 -0.0529 -0.0510 0.0088
t =  8 1988:3-1989:1 [-3.13] [-1.59] [0.73] [-2.87] [-3.05] [0.87]
t =  8 1988:3-1989:1 -0.0205 -0.0325 -0.0159 -0.0015 0.0007 -0.0218
t =  7 1989:3-1990:1 [-2.78] [-2.64] [-1.42] [-0.29] [0.47] [-1.17]
t =  7 1989:3-1990:1 -0.0223 -0.0176 -0.0225 -0.0167 -0.0235 -0.0104
t =  6 1990:3-1991:1 [-2.71] [-2.39] [-1.68] [-2.93] [-2.89] [-1.38]
t =  6 1990:3-1991:1 -0.0044 -0.0127 -0.0111 -0.0005 0.0018 -0.0026
t =  5 1991:3-1992:1 [-1.39] [-1.88] [-1.43] [-0.11] [0.78] [-0.54]
t =  5 1991:3-1992:1 -0.0170 -0.0218 -0.0374 -0.0220 -0.0196 -0.0033
t =  4 1992:3-1993:1 [-2.65] [-2.79] [-3.05] [-3.04] [-2.78] [-0.48]
t =  4 1992:3-1993:1 -0.0066 -0.0142 -0.0080 -0.0044 -0.0091 -0.0046
t =  3 1993:3-1994:1 [-1.78] [-2.08] [-1.32] [-1.06] [-1.47] [-1.15]
t =  3 1993:3-1994:1 0.0011 0.0006 0.0029 0.0074 -0.0011 0.0049
t =  2 1994:3-1995:1 [0.52] [0.28] [0.33] [1.99] [-0.63] [0.74]
t =  2 1994:3-1995:1 0.0041 -0.0017 0.0019 -0.0058 0.0048 -0.0023
t =  1 1995:3-1996:1 [0.81] [-0.36] [0.84] [-0.93] [0.47] [-0.19]
t =  1 1995:3-1996:1 -0.0070 -0.0079 -0.0061 -0.0032 -0.0107 -0.0034
t = 0 1996:3-1997:1 [-2.13] [-2.09] [-0.73] [-0.31] [-2.07] [-0.24]
t = 0 1996:3-1997:1 -0.0010 -0.0114 -0.0074 -0.0027 -0.0173 -0.0059
t = 1 1997:3-1998:1 [-0.30] [-2.74] [-0.51] [-0.63] [-2.84] [-0.61]
t = 1 1997:3-1998:1 0.0129 0.0167 0.0015 0.0117 0.0179 0.0100
t = 2 1998:3-1999:1 [3.47] [3.19] [0.90] [2.96] [3.41] [0.94]
t = 2 1998:3-1999:1 -0.0090 -0.0157 -0.0122 -0.0120 -0.0145 -0.0139
t = 3 1999:3-2000:1 [-2.78] [-3.08] [-1.72] [-3.12] [-2.96] [-1.78]
Notes: *, ** and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The table reports
t-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method.
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Table 4. Di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates. Temporary workers
Men Women
Period Quarters 16 to 29 30 to 45 46 to 64 16 to 29 30 to 45
t =  9 1987:3-1988:1 0.0114 -0.0233 -0.0163 0.0506 0.0415
t =  8 1988:3-1989:1 [1.47] [-1.39] [-1.10] [2.86] [1.50]
t =  7 1989:3-1990:1
t =  8 1988:3-1989:1 -0.0016 0.0142 -0.0071 -0.0150 -0.0270
t =  7 1989:3-1990:1 [-0.41] [1.28] [-0.78] [-1.31] [-1.43]
t =  6 1990:3-1991:1
t =  7 1989:3-1990:1 0.0166 0.0030 0.0055 0.0174 0.0258
t =  6 1990:3-1991:1 [1.98] [0.37] [0.82] [2.43] [1.18]
t =  5 1991:3-1992:1
t =  6 1990:3-1991:1 -0.0105 -0.0115 -0.0226 -0.0121 -0.0169
t =  5 1991:3-1992:1 [-1.90] [-1.27] [-1.07] [-1.32] [-1.07]
t =  4 1992:3-1993:1
t =  5 1991:3-1992:1 0.0124 0.0132 0.0032 0.0308 0.0161
t =  4 1992:3-1993:1 [2.07] [0.84] [1.34] [2.77] [1.02]
t =  3 1993:3-1994:1
t =  4 1992:3-1993:1 0.0073 0.0113 0.0118 0.0157 0.0092
t =  3 1993:3-1994:1 [0.51] [0.67] [0.76] [1.79] [0.93]
t =  2 1994:3-1995:1
t =  3 1993:3-1994:1 0.0028 -0.0020 0.0018 -0.0131 0.0075
t =  2 1994:3-1995:1 [0.79] [-0.59] [0.58] [-1.82] [0.60]
t =  1 1995:3-1996:1
t =  2 1994:3-1995:1 -0.0089 -0.0059 -0.0072 0.0023 -0.0165
t =  1 1995:3-1996:1 [-1.09] [-0.51] [-1.14] [0.45] [-0.76]
t = 0 1996:3-1997:1
t =  1 1995:3-1996:1 0.0061 -0.0025 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0056
t = 0 1996:3-1997:1 [0.33] [-0.73] [-0.87] [0.52] [-0.36]
t = 1 1997:3-1998:1
t = 0 1996:3-1997:1 0.0141 0.0299 0.0136 0.0134 0.0397
t = 1 1997:3-1998:1 [2.85] [2.74] [1.51] [2.26] [3.28]
t = 2 1998:3-1999:1
t = 1 1997:3-1998:1 -0.0166 -0.0225 0.0001 -0.0233 -0.0347
t = 2 1998:3-1999:1 [-2.31] [-2.18] [0.94] [-2.63] [-3.13]
t = 3 1999:3-2000:1
Notes: *, ** and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The table reports
t-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method.
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Table 5. DDD estimates. Young temporary workers
Period Quarters Men Women
t =  9 1987:3-1988:1 -0.0102 -0.0662
t =  8 1988:3-1989:1 [-1.48] [-1.98]
t =  7 1989:3-1990:1
t =  6 1990:3-1991:1
t =  8 1988:3-1989:1 0.0172 0.0344
t =  7 1989:3-1990:1 [0.83] [2.11]
t =  6 1990:3-1991:1
t =  5 1991:3-1992:1
t =  7 1989:3-1990:1 -0.0213 -0.0191
t =  6 1990:3-1991:1 [-1.32] [-1.17]
t =  5 1991:3-1992:1
t =  4 1992:3-1993:1
t =  6 1990:3-1991:1 0.0194 -0.0220
t =  5 1991:3-1992:1 [1.26] [-0.74]
t =  4 1992:3-1993:1
t =  3 1993:3-1994:1
t =  5 1991:3-1992:1 -0.0037 -0.0915
t =  4 1992:3-1993:1 [-0.55] [-0.63]
t =  3 1993:3-1994:1
t =  2 1994:3-1995:1
t =  4 1992:3-1993:1 -0.0047 -0.0352
t =  3 1993:3-1994:1 [-0.53] [-2.38]
t =  2 1994:3-1995:1
t =  1 1995:3-1996:1
t =  3 1993:3-1994:1 -0.0139 0.0147
t =  2 1994:3-1995:1 [-1.22] [1.36]
t =  1 1995:3-1996:1
t = 0 1996:3-1997:1
t =  2 1994:3-1995:1 0.0171 -0.0021
t =  1 1995:3-1996:1 [2.07] [-1.18]
t = 0 1996:3-1997:1
t = 1 1997:3-1998:1
t =  1 1995:3-1996:1 0.0064 0.0117
t = 0 1996:3-1997:1 [1.53] [1.61]
t = 1 1997:3-1998:1
t = 2 1998:3-1999:1
t = 0 1996:3-1997:1 -0.0274 -0.0430
t = 1 1997:3-1998:1 [1.47] [2.30]
t = 2 1998:3-1999:1
t = 3 1999:3-2000:1
Notes: *, ** and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The table reports
t-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method.
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Table 6. Between-groups estimates. Temporary workers
Men Women
Period Quarters 16 to 29 46 to 64 16 to 29 46 to 64
t =  9 1987:3-1988:1 -0.0128 -0.0183 0.0236 0.0058
[-0.50] [-1.13] [0.64] [1.16]
t =  8 1988:3-1989:1 0.0099 -0.0034 -0.0110 -0.0475
[0.87] [-0.52] [-0.76] [-1.98]
t =  7 1989:3-1990:1 -0.0032 -0.0056 -0.0106 -0.0090
[-0.53] [-0.87] [-0.90] [-0.57]
t =  6 1990:3-1991:1 0.0029 -0.0409 -0.0615 -0.0031
[0.38] [-1.67] [-2.07] [-0.34]
t =  5 1991:3-1992:1 0.0033 -0.0646 -0.0067 -0.0148
[0.37] [-1.85] [-0.54] [-0.51]
t =  4 1992:3-1993:1 0.0046 -0.0290 0.0005 -0.0052
[0.46] [-0.54] [0.39] [-0.50]
t =  3 1993:3-1994:1 -0.0131 0.0016 0.0043 -0.0062
[-0.93] [0.32] [0.21] [-0.38]
t =  2 1994:3-1995:1 0.0037 -0.0111 -0.0121 -0.0175
[0.76] [-0.31] [-0.94] [-1.04]
t =  1 1995:3-1996:1 -0.0028 -0.0021 -0.0034 -0.0052
[-0.44] [-0.46] [-0.42] [-0.30]
t = 0 1996:3-1997:1 -0.0136 -0.0074 -0.0045 -0.0209
[-2.17] [-0.72] [-0.22] [-1.68]
t = 1 1997:3-1998:1 -0.0128 -0.0069 -0.0130 0.0065
[-1.83] [-0.88] [-2.29] [0.18]
t = 2 1998:3-1999:1 -0.0137 0.0129 -0.0017 -0.0060
[-1.85] [1.95] [-0.30] [-0.71]
t = 3 1999:3-2000:1 -0.0139 0.0015 -0.0066 0.0071
[-1.91] [0.71] [-0.41] [0.39]
Notes: *, ** and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The reference
group are middle-aged workers. The table reports t-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are
calculated using the delta method.
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Table 7. Before-After estimates. Unemployed workers
Men Women
Period Quarters 16 to 29 30 to 45 46 to 64 16 to 29 30 to 45 46 to 64
t =  9 1987:3-1988:1 -0.0024 -0.0090 -0.0191 -0.0009 0.0026 -0.0177
t =  8 1988:3-1989:1 [-0.75] [-0.99] [-1.11] [-0.54] [0.19] [-0.28]
t =  8 1988:3-1989:1 -0.0100 -0.0022 -0.0078 -0.0044 0.0006 -0.0189
t =  7 1989:3-1990:1 [-2.79] [-0.32] [-1.41] [-1.88] [0.43] [-0.71]
t =  7 1989:3-1990:1 -0.0004 -0.0108 0.0075 -0.0033 -0.0024 -0.0064
t =  6 1990:3-1991:1 [-1.02] [-1.78] [0.53] [-1.75] [-0.43] [-0.57]
t =  6 1990:3-1991:1 -0.0066 -0.0027 -0.0129 -0.0008 -0.0027 -0.0007
t =  5 1991:3-1992:1 [-2.81] [-0.76] [-1.39] [-0.17] [-0.85] [-0.49]
t =  5 1991:3-1992:1 -0.0082 -0.0061 -0.0039 -0.0041 -0.0051 -0.0011
t =  4 1992:3-1993:1 [-2.57] [-1.91] [-1.17] [-2.97] [-1.78] [-0.41]
t =  4 1992:3-1993:1 -0.0004 -0.0022 -0.0007 0.0008 0.0006 0.0049
t =  3 1993:3-1994:1 [0.87] [-0.50] [-0.51] [0.32] [0.41] [0.95]
t =  3 1993:3-1994:1 -0.0005 0.0028 0.0061 -0.0027 -0.0016 -0.0008
t =  2 1994:3-1995:1 [-0.74] [0.27] [0.89] [-2.39] [-0.54] [-0.61]
t =  2 1994:3-1995:1 0.0003 -0.0032 -0.0106 0.0012 0.0022 -0.0016
t =  1 1995:3-1996:1 [-0.35] [-0.57] [0.28] [0.43] [0.65] [-0.31]
t =  1 1995:3-1996:1 0.0013 0.0022 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0009 0.0036
t = 0 1996:3-1997:1 [-1.05] [0.11] [-0.19] [0.74] [-0.84] [0.51]
t = 0 1996:3-1997:1 0.0022 0.0004 0.0094 0.0017 0.0033 0.0005
t = 1 1997:3-1998:1 [1.68] [0.15] [2.71] [1.71] [2.28] [0.49]
t = 1 1997:3-1998:1 0.0051 0.0070 0.0010 0.0049 0.0030 -0.0033
t = 2 1998:3-1999:1 [2.13] [2.15] [0.93] [3.11] [1.81] [-0.50]
t = 2 1998:3-1999:1 -0.0001 -0.0027 0.0023 -0.0015 0.0001 0.0043
t = 3 1999:3-2000:1 [-0.22] [0.51] [0.27] [0.42] [0.19] [-1.99]
Notes: *, ** and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The table reports
t-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method.
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Table 8. Di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates. Unemployed workers
Men Women
Period Quarters 16 to 29 30 to 45 16 to 29 30 to 45
t =  9 1987:3-1988:1 -0.0077 0.0085 -0.0042 -0.0053
t =  8 1988:3-1989:1 [-0.89] [0.91] [-0.18] [-0.73]
t =  7 1989:3-1990:1
t =  8 1988:3-1989:1 0.0113 -0.0081 0.0020 -0.0043
t =  7 1989:3-1990:1 [2.08] [-1.37] [-0.75] [-1.52]
t =  6 1990:3-1991:1
t =  7 1989:3-1990:1 -0.0050 0.0050 0.0022 0.0003
t =  6 1990:3-1991:1 [-0.42] [0.81] [0.93] [0.47]
t =  5 1991:3-1992:1
t =  6 1990:3-1991:1 -0.0031 -0.0024 -0.0023 -0.0057
t =  5 1991:3-1992:1 [-0.31] [-1.01] [-0.59] [-0.53]
t =  4 1992:3-1993:1
t =  5 1991:3-1992:1 0.0076 0.0044 0.0039 0.0079
t =  4 1992:3-1993:1 [1.76] [0.71] [1.31] [0.73]
t =  3 1993:3-1994:1
t =  4 1992:3-1993:1 0.0005 0.0047 -0.0033 -0.0027
t =  3 1993:3-1994:1 [0.17] [0.59] [-1.47] [-0.95]
t =  2 1994:3-1995:1
t =  3 1993:3-1994:1 0.0010 -0.0065 0.0038 0.0039
t =  2 1994:3-1995:1 [0.47] [-0.44] [0.61] [1.18]
t =  1 1995:3-1996:1
t =  2 1994:3-1995:1 0.0012 0.0051 -0.0012 -0.0031
t =  1 1995:3-1996:1 [0.52] [0.83] [-0.92] [-0.31]
t = 0 1996:3-1997:1
t =  1 1995:3-1996:1 0.0010 -0.0012 0.0017 0.0045
t = 0 1996:3-1997:1 [0.63] [-1.08] [1.48] [1.87]
t = 1 1997:3-1998:1
t = 0 1996:3-1997:1 0.0033 0.0076 0.0032 0.0002
t = 1 1997:3-1998:1 [1.45] [2.77] [1.31] [0.57]
t = 2 1998:3-1999:1
t = 1 1997:3-1998:1 -0.0049 -0.0095 -0.0074 -0.0026
t = 2 1998:3-1999:1 [-2.28] [-2.31] [-2.03] [-1.47]
t = 3 1999:3-2000:1
Notes: *, ** and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The table reports
t-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method.
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Table 9. Between-groups estimates. Unemployed workers
Men Women
Period Quarters 16 to 29 46 to 64 16 to 29 46 to 64
t =  9 1987:3-1988:1 -0.0114 0.0036 -0.0072 -0.0181
[-0.82] [1.47] [-0.62] [-0.57]
t =  8 1988:3-1989:1 -0.0043 0.0199 -0.0028 -0.0049
[-0.31] [1.27] [-0.31] [-0.39]
t =  7 1989:3-1990:1 0.0096 0.0238 0.0036 -0.0044
[0.39] [1.63] [0.38] [-0.41]
t =  6 1990:3-1991:1 0.0061 0.0107 0.0078 0.0099
[0.85] [1.95] [1.98] [0.64]
t =  5 1991:3-1992:1 -0.0121 0.0093 -0.0022 -0.0058
[-1.72] [0.39] [-0.61] [0.79]
t =  4 1992:3-1993:1 -0.0227 0.0025 -0.0006 0.0033
[-1.89] [0.97] [-0.63] [0.31]
t =  3 1993:3-1994:1 -0.0043 0.0062 0.0011 -0.0051
[-0.63] [0.36] [0.41] [-0.38]
t =  2 1994:3-1995:1 0.0020 -0.0033 0.0014 -0.0048
[0.42] [-0.42] [0.49] [-0.53]
t =  1 1995:3-1996:1 -0.0009 -0.0023 0.0018 -0.0047
[-0.48] [-0.98] [0.37] [-0.79]
t = 0 1996:3-1997:1 0.0027 0.0089 -0.0031 -0.0007
[0.94] [1.53] [-0.28] [-0.29]
t = 1 1997:3-1998:1 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0035 0.0032
[-0.31] [-0.72] [2.18] [1.25]
t = 2 1998:3-1999:1 -0.0125 0.0090 -0.0009 0.0021
[-1.94] [2.38] [-0.27] [0.79]
t = 3 1999:3-2000:1 -0.0129 -0.0090 -0.0202 0.0001
[-1.77] [-2.25] [-1.73] [0.71]
Notes: *, ** and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The reference
group are middle-aged workers. The table reports t-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are
calculated using the delta method.
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Figure 1. Temporary to permanent contract transition probability between quarters
t and t+ 1. Men
Figure 2. Temporary to permanent contract transition probability between quarters
t and t+ 1. Women
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Figure 3. Unemployment to permanent contract transition probability between
quarters t and t+ 1. Men
Figure 4. Unemployment to permanent contract transition probability between
quarters t and t+ 1. Women
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